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In forced-choice questionnaires, respondents have to make choices between two or 
more items presented at the same time. Several IRT models have been developed to link 
respondent choices to underlying psychological attributes, including the recent MUPP (Stark, 
Chernyshenko & Drasgow, 2005) and Thurstonian IRT (Brown & Maydeu-Olivares, 2011) 
models. In the present article, a common framework is proposed that describes forced-choice 
models along three axes: 1) the forced-choice format used; 2) the measurement model for the 
relationships between items and psychological attributes they measure; and 3) the decision 
model for choice behavior. Using the framework, fundamental properties of forced-choice 
measurement of individual differences are considered. It is shown that the scale origin for the 
attributes is generally identified in questionnaires using either unidimensional or 
multidimensional comparisons. Both dominance and ideal point models can be used to 
provide accurate forced-choice measurement; and the rules governing accurate person score 
estimation with these models are remarkably similar.  
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Item Response Models for Forced-Choice Questionnaires: A Common Framework 
The most popular way of gathering responses to personality and similar items is to ask 
respondents to evaluate one item at a time, independently of other items (single-stimulus 
format). An alternative way is to ask respondents to choose between several items presented 
at the same time, for example to indicate which statement describes them best – “I am relaxed 
most of the time” or “I do things according to a plan”. Regardless of whether all or none of 
the items is evaluated favorably by a respondent, he/she will be forced to make a choice 
(hence the name – forced-choice format). With the single-stimulus formats, respondents 
make absolute judgments about every item. With the forced-choice formats, respondents 
engage in comparative judgments, assessing relative merits of the items.  
Comparative judgments may be preferred to absolute judgments in many contexts. 
Because it is impossible to endorse all items, comparative judgments are effective whenever 
differentiation between responses is desired. For example, in situations where strong “halo” 
effects are present, or when respondents are likely to acquiesce, or use a limited range of a 
rating scale, forcing choice may result in more usable data (Bartram, 2007; Chan, 2003; 
Cheung & Chan, 2002; Maydeu-Olivares & Böckenholt, 2008). Forced-choice formats 
remove uniformly elevated or decreased judgments across all items, therefore eliminating 
rater effects such as leniency / severity (Cheung & Chan, 2002). It has even been argued that 
combining equally desirable items in the same block prevents respondents from endorsing the 
desirable items and rejecting the undesirable ones, thus reducing socially desirable 
responding (Christiansen, Burns & Montgomery, 2005; Jackson, Wroblewski & Ashton, 
2000; Martin, Bowen & Hunt, 2001; Vasilopoulos et al., 2006). Finally yet importantly, 
direct comparisons between items remove the need for any response categories or rating 




Despite these potential advantages, until recently the use of forced-choice 
questionnaires has been controversial because their classical scoring yielded ipsative data 
(from Latin ipse, or relative to self). As the name suggests, the ipsative scores are scaled in 
relation to the person mean, and while suitable for intra-individual assessments, they are not 
suitable for inter-individual comparisons. The psychometric problems of ipsative data are 
well described in the literature; see, for instance, Clemans (1970) for a full account of 
ipsative mathematics, and Meade (2004) for evidence of empirical problems when ipsative 
data are used for selection decisions.   
These pitfalls of ipsative data were unfortunate since the main objective of 
psychometric questionnaires is to scale the objects of assessment (typically people) on some 
attributes so that they can be compared to the scale origin and to each other. In an attempt to 
infer proper measurement from forced-choice data, at least six Item Response Theory (IRT) 
models have been developed. These are the Zinnes-Griggs (1974) model, Andrich’s (1989) 
IRT model for unfolding preference data and the Hyperbolic Cosine Model for pairwise 
preferences (Andrich, 1995), the Multi-Unidimensional Pairwise-Preference (MUPP) model 
(Stark, Chernyshenko & Drasgow, 2005), a multidimensional unfolding approach by 
McCloy, Heggestad and Reeve (2005), and the Thurstonian IRT model (Brown & Maydeu-
Olivares, 2011). Yet, many researchers and test users are confused about the merits of these 
models. For example, there is much confusion around the ability to infer proper measurement 
from forced-choice data using different item types (see Drasgow, Chernyshenko & Stark, 
2010; also Brown & Maydeu-Olivares, 2010). Unfortunately, despite a vast literature on 
choice models, including some excellent reviews (e.g. McFadden, 2001; Böckenholt, 2006), 
most works focus on models that are stimulus-centric, not person-centric.  The main 
motivation for the former models is to establish properties of the stimuli (for example, in 




differences. Although relying on the same theories of choice behavior as stimulus-centric 
models do (for example, Thurstone’s law of comparative judgment or Luce’s choice axioms), 
person-centric applications necessitate the use of specialized forced-choice designs, item 
types, and measurement models. These issues have not been given enough attention in the 
psychometric literature, nor have they been treated in a consistent fashion so that cross-model 
comparisons could be made. 
The present article aims to fill this gap by providing a common framework for 
describing models for forced-choice questionnaire data. The framework relies on the notion 
of a psychological value, or utility (Thurstone, 1929), elicited by every item presented to 
respondents. Utilities are assumed to vary between respondents, to be underlain by some 
psychological attributes we intend to measure, and to have a random error component. Then, 
the different models proposed for forced-choice data can be classified along three axes: 1) the 
forced-choice format used (i.e. whether the items are presented in pairs, or larger ranking 
blocks); 2) how the relationship between the utilities and the attributes is specified (for 
instance, assuming a dominance or an ideal point process); and 3) how the utilities are linked 
to the observed choices. Using the proposed framework, fundamental properties of forced-
choice data for measurement of individual differences on psychological attributes are 
discussed. Specifically, the conditions for identification of the scale origin, which was the 
main challenge for ipsative data, are laid out. Merits of the existing IRT models for forced-
choice questionnaires are discussed based on these fundamental properties and the article 
concludes with a discussion and suggestions for innovation.   
Three Axes to Classify Forced-Choice Models 
Item response models for forced-choice questionnaire data differ because they may 




measurement models to describe the relationship between the items and the psychological 
attributes they measure; and (3) decision models to explain choices between items. These are 
the basic axes necessary to describe any forced-choice model. 
Questionnaires may use different forced-choice formats to gather data; for example, 
respondents may be asked to make a choice between two alternatives, or perform full or 
partial ranking on a larger set of alternatives. Because questionnaire items serve as indicators 
of some higher order dimensions of interest, a measurement model is needed to describe the 
relationships between the items and psychological attributes they measure. A decision model 
is needed to describe the process that respondents adopt when making choices between items. 
The decision model postulates the mechanism for preferring one item to the other. Options 
available within each of the three axes are described below.  
1. Forced-Choice Formats 
Forced-choice questionnaires typically consist of many individual choice tasks. The 
choice tasks within a questionnaire will be referred to as “blocks”. Each block may involve 
two or more items.  
The simplest forced-choice block constitutes a pair of items {i, k}, out of which 
respondents are asked to select one item according to some instruction (for instance, select a 
statement which describes own behavior most accurately). There are only two possible 
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 . (1) 
A forced-choice block may involve three or more items at once. Respondents may be 
asked to rank order n items (i.e. assign them ranking positions from 1 to n). Any given rank 
ordering of n items is fully described by ( 1) / 2n n n   dummy variables, representing 
binary comparisons between all possible pairs of items. For example:  
Ranking Dummy variables 
A B C D {A,B} {A,C} {A,D} {B,C} {B,D} {C,D} 
1 3 4 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Alternatively, respondents may be asked to indicate only the most preferred item in a 
block, resulting in a partial ranking, because outcomes of some pairwise comparisons are not 
collected by design. Another common design is asking respondents to indicate the most and 
the least preferred items, for example: 
Partial ranking Dummy variables 
A B C D {A,B} {A,C} {A,D} {B,C} {B,D} {C,D} 
most  least  1 1 1 1 . 0 
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 Here, the standard coding procedure in the Thurstonian choice literature (Maydeu-Olivares & 
Böckenholt, 2005) is adopted. It is important to note that at the point of coding, no assumptions are made about 




Another format is ranking with ties, also known as Q-sort (Block, 1961). Q-sorts 
typically involve all questionnaire items in one giant “block”, in which respondents assigns 
the individual items to few rank-ordered groups (for more detail, see Brown & Maydeu-
Olivares, in press). Consequently, the ranks of items in the same group are tied, so that 
information on the relative preferences within groups is not gathered by design. The dummy 
coding described above applies to Q-sorts. As can be seen, all types of data gathered in 
forced-choice tasks may be described using binary variables. 
2. Measurement Models for Item-Attribute Relationships  
In questionnaires, items serve as indicators of a number of psychological attributes, so 
that any item evaluations by respondents depend on these attributes. Evaluations of individual 
items (absolute judgments), however, are not observed in forced-choice questionnaires. Only 
outcomes of comparative judgments (e.g. preferred – not preferred) are observed. Thus, 
measurement models describing relationships between the items and the attributes must rely 
on latent evaluations of items. Thurstone’s notion of item utility has been widely used in the 
literature to describe unobserved item evaluations, and it will be used here. 
Thurstone proposed that any presented object elicits a psychological value, or utility 
in a respondent, which he described as “the affect that the object calls forth” (Thurstone, 
1929; p. 160). Depending on the nature of assessment, the utility of a questionnaire item 
might represent the degree of attractiveness of a concept described by the item, likeness to the 
respondent’s own behavior or personality, the level of agreement with an opinion etc.  
People vary in their utilities for an item. This variation can be partitioned into two 
sources – individual differences on personal attributes that the item measures, and all other 
person-by-item interactions. In person-centric applications, the former is the focus of 




using a latent variable, with the systematic part being a function of personal attributes and/or 
fixed characteristics of items (e.g. Andersen, 1976), and the random part representing all 
other item-by-person interactions. In this random utility model, the utility of item i for person 
j, tji, is the sum of the systematic part jit  and the random part ji 
  ji ji j jit t  θ , (2) 
where 
jit is a function of psychological attributes  1 2θ ,θ ,...,θj j jdj
θ of person j (hence the 
person subscript) and some fixed item properties (hence the subscript i). It is assumed that the 
random errors are independent of the person attributes and among each other. 
Specific models may be postulated to describe the general relationships (2). Here we 
consider the most popular measurement models – linear factor analysis models (Brady, 1989; 
McDonald, 1999) and ideal point models (Takane, 1987; Brady, 1989). This list may be 
extended; for instance, one could adopt the Wandering Vector model (De Soete & Carroll, 
1983) etc. 
Linear Factor Analysis (LFA) models 
In linear factor models, the utility of person j for item i is described as a linear 
function of the item mean i, d personal attributes  1 2, ,...,j j jdj   θ or common factors, 













Questionnaire items are most often designed to tap into one attribute only. In this 
case, the matrix of factor loadings  has only one non-zero entry in every row (has an 
independent clusters basis; McDonald, 1999). 
The LFA model has proven to be a reasonably good approximation when 
questionnaire items represent decisively positive or negative standing on the attribute 
continuum. Examples of such items are “I keep my paperwork in order” and “My paperwork 
is always in disarray“, respectively, to indicate Orderliness. As the Orderliness score 
increases, the utility for the first item should increase, and for the second item decrease – the 
utility judgment therefore reflects a dominance response process. 
Ideal Point (IP) models 
The term “ideal point” was coined by Coombs (1960) based on the original work of 
Thurstone (1928). Thurstone argued that the psychological value for a statement such as “Fire 
arms should not belong in private hands” is the highest for a person with this exact level of 
the attitude towards Militarism. For this person, statements representing either higher or 
lower levels of Militarism should have lower utilities. Coombs called this point of maximum 
utility on the attribute continuum a person’s “ideal point”. In ideal point models, it is assumed 
that people and items can be represented by points in the same attribute space, and that a 
person’s utility for an item increases as the distance between the ideal point (person location) 
and the item locations decreases.  
Originally suggested for attitude items, the ideal point models have been recently 
considered for wider use (Drasgow, Chernyshenko & Stark, 2010). For instance, the utility of 
personality item “My attention to detail is about average” is expected to be highest for people 
with average “Orderliness”, and lower for people with either extremely high or low 




Formally, a multidimensional ideal point model describes the utility of person j for 
item i as the linear function of the item mean i, the minus distance between the person 
location (ideal point)  1 2, ,...,j j jdj   θ and the item location  1 2, ,...,i i i id    δ , and the 
random error ji 
  , εj iji i jit D   θ δ . (4) 
Two main types of ideal point models have been proposed based on how the person-
item distance is defined. Shepard (1957), Coombs (1960) and other authors defined the 












      
 
 . (5) 












      . (6) 
Takane (1996) argued for the use of the more algebraically tractable squared 
Euclidean distance form on the grounds of its (slightly) better fit to empirical data. He was 
also concerned about the limited range in which comparisons between one-dimensional items 
of the Euclidean distance form discriminate (see discussion following expression (35) further 
in this article).  
The common feature of the basic ideal point models discussed so far is that only one 
item property – item location – matters for the utility judgment. Unlike in LFA models, no 




items are considered equally good indicators of the attributes. This assumption may be too 
strong for many psychological assessments. To allow items differ in the abilities to measure 
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      ,      (8) 
using the Euclidean distance of the squared Euclidean distance respectively. Zero weights 
make some attributes irrelevant to the item utility judgment, easily accommodating the most 
common independent-clusters design. Positive
2
 but differing weights would allow the 
attributes to influence the utility judgment to different extents.  
3. Decision Models for Choice Behavior 
Absolute evaluations of items are the basis of measurement of the underlying 
attributes. To model forced-choice questionnaire data, however, the decision mechanism by 
which respondents make comparative judgments must be considered. Presumably, 
comparative judgments are underpinned by absolute judgments about each item under 
comparison. This is indeed the case in popular decision theories. The oldest and best-known 
model for choice behavior is Thurstone’s (1927) law of comparative judgment. Other 
influential models are Coombs’s (1950) unfolding preference model, Luce’s (1959) choice 
axioms, Tversky’s (1972) “elimination by aspect” theory and others. The former three have 
been applied to modelling forced-choice questionnaire data.   
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Thurstone’s Law of Comparative Judgment  
Using the notion of item utility, Thurstone (1927) argued that the relative utilities of 
items at the time of comparison determine the choices between them. That is, person j prefers 
item i to item k if his/her utility for i is greater
3
 than his/her utility for k:  
 { , }
1,     if     











When comparing three or more items, person j assigns ranks according to the relative 
order of his/her utilities for the items; that is, the utilities of items ranked 1, 2 ,.., n must be 
ordered so that tj1  tj2  … tjn. It follows that for every pairwise combination of items 
within a ranking block, inequalities (9) must hold. 
It is easy to see that in (9), the difference of utilities,  
 
*
{ , }j i k ji jky t t  , (10) 
is the latent response tendency, which is mapped onto the discrete response scale of observed 
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Thurstone’s simple law provides a flexible mechanism for explaining choice behavior 
in many contexts by adopting suitable operationalization of utility. Despite the deterministic 
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 The equality sign in (9) is arbitrary because the utilities are continuous variables and two utilities can 




rule of utility maximization, probabilistic modeling of preference responses is easily achieved 
by considering utility judgment a random process, as in (2). To describe the probability of 
preferring one item to another conditional on the attributes, an appropriate link function is 
chosen depending on the assumed distribution of the utility random parts ji. Thurstone’s 
assumption of normality of errors (and consequently normality of their difference) demands 
the normal ogive (probit) link function. The usual assumption of independent errors, once the 
attributes have been controlled for, leads to the additive variance for the error of the utility 
difference, var(i –k) = var(i) + var(k). Denoting error variances for utilities of items i and k 
as i and k respectively, the probability of preferring i to k is 
  
   
 
{ , } 1/2
2 2
1
ji j jk j





   
   
θ θ
θ . (12) 
Coombs’s Unfolding Preference Model 
In his choice model, Coombs (1950) assumed the proximity, or ideal point, process 
underlying evaluations of individual items. Thus, given the choice between two stimuli, a 
person will prefer the stimulus located nearer to his/her own position (ideal point) on the 
attribute continuum. Then, the preference ordering of n items should correspond to the 
inversed order of the items’ distances from the person position (Coombs, 1950). The 
preferred item can lie to the left or to the right of the person’s ideal point, as long as it is 
closer to the ideal point than the other item. Any preferential rank ordering, therefore, is the 
same as the orders of the item locations “folded” at the person location. In the unidimensional 
case that Coombs considered, he operationalized the person-item distance as the absolute 




Bennett and Hays (1960) generalized Coombs’s theory to multiple attributes. Let 
 1 2θ ,θ ,...,θj j jdj θ  be the location of person j in a space defined by d attributes, and 
 1 2, ,...,i i i id    δ  be the location of item i in the same space. Given choice between items i 
and k, the person will prefer the item with the smallest distance  ,j iD θ δ from own location: 
 
   
   
{ , }
1,     if     , ,
0,    if     , ,
j i j k
j i k







θ δ θ δ
θ δ θ δ
. (13) 
Because in (13) each item “has one and only one scale position for all individuals” 
and that “each individual has one and only one scale position for all [items]” (Coombs, 1950, 
p.146), the model has a major drawback – it is fully deterministic. Given choice between two 
items, the person will prefer the item closer to own location with probability 1. Such a model 
is likely to fit forced-choice questionnaire data poorly. To describe empirical preferential 
choices, various models have been proposed that introduce random processes in the 
judgments of distance, ideal point or item location (e.g., Zinnes & Griggs, 1974).   
The relation to Thurstone’s model. It is easy to see that the unfolding preference 
model (13) is a special case of Thurstone’s model (9). Indeed, if we conceptualize the person-
item distance as minus the utility – Zinnes and Griggs (1974) called it “disutility” – the two 
models make identical predictions. Thus, the unfolding preference model is a special case of 
the law of comparative judgment, where the utility takes the form  ,j ijit D  θ δ . When 
this deterministic expression for the item utility is modified by adopting the random ideal 
point model (4), Coombs’s decision model yields the probability of preferring one item to 
another of the form (12). It is essentially a Thurstonian probabilistic model, where the ideal 




Luce’s Choice Axioms and Bradley-Terry Model 
Luce (1959) took a top-down approach to describing individual choice behavior and 
postulated a set of general assumptions (axioms). His axiom of independence from irrelevant 
alternatives (or independence of context) states that the ratio of probabilities of choosing item 
i and choosing item k must be independent of the set to which these items belong. Applied to 
forced-choice modelling, there exists a ratio scale ji, representing person j’s response 
strength associated with item i (Luce, 1977), such that the probability of choosing item i from 
block S (or ranking item i first) is proportional to response strength of i:  












A special case of this mathematical model for choice tasks with two alternatives 
(blocks of size n = 2) was proposed earlier by Bradley and Terry (1952). They postulated that 
if there exists a ratio scale ji, representing person j’s true ratings of the items, then the 
probability of preferring item i to item k is proportional to the items’ true ratings: ji/(ji+jk).  
The strong ratio properties assumed for item true ratings (“response strength” in 
Luce’s terminology) led Bradley (1953) to a very convenient operationalization of them as 
the exponential function of item utility ji = exp(tji). However, in applications oriented toward 
measurement of individual differences, “strict utility” models are replaced by random utility 
models such as (2). Then, the conditional probability of preferring i to k is a logistic function 
of the systematic parts of the item utilities 
  
  




exp exp 1 exp
ji j
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P y










More generally, McFadden (1973) showed that when the utility judgments are 
independent, the probability of selecting item i from block S is a logistic function of utilities, 
obtained by using ji = exp(tji) in expression (14). Because in random utility models (2), the 
errors are assumed independent after the utility judgments are conditioned on the personal 
attributes, Luce’s axiom of independence from irrelevant alternatives  applies. Thus, the 
probability of ranking item i first in block S is a generalization of the logistic response 
function (15) to blocks of size n > 2: 
  
  
        
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The relation to Thurstone’s model. Parallels between the notions of Luce’s 
“response strength”, Bradley and Terry’s “true rating”, and Thurstone’s “utility” are obvious. 
However, Thurstone’s theory placed no conditions on the probability of choosing item i from 
a block beyond implying that it must equal the probability that the utility of i is the largest of 
all other items’ utilities. Luce’s condition (14) is more restrictive in prescribing “response 
probability proportional to response strength” (Luce, 1977; p. 216). Nearly identical 
prediction to those of Luce’s model (departing by .02 at most) can be generated with the most 
restrictive case of Thurstone’s model (Case V), where the utilities are assumed identically 
and independently distributed with equal variances (Luce, 1959). The prediction becomes 
perfect if the differences of utility judgments are distributed logistically rather than normally. 
Therefore, Luce’s theory is consistent with Thurstone’s model of choice behavior (Luce, 
1977), when describing choices between independent alternatives with equal variances. 
When utility judgments are dependent, Luce’s choice axiom has been shown to 




(McFadden, 1976). In forced-choice questionnaires, this would be commonplace since 
utilities of items depend on underlying psychological attributes. This problem, however, is 
solved by the use of random utility models and conditional probabilities. Once utility 
judgments have been controlled for the attributes, the random parts are independent. 
Assuming in addition that the random parts are identically distributed as double exponential
4
 
(their differences are then distributed logistically), expressions (15) and (16) provide suitable 
models for selecting item i from two or more alternatives, respectively (Takane & de Leeuw, 
1987). 
Andrich’s Forced Endorsement Model5 
Andrich (1989; also 1995) was interested in deriving the explicit probability of 
preferring one item in a pair (block size n = 2) from the probabilities of endorsement of the 
individual items. For this, he suggested a possible discrete response process whereby a person 
implicitly reacts to each item, reaching four possible outcomes: endorsing both items, (yi = 1, 
yk = 1); not endorsing either, (yi = 0, yk = 0); endorsing i but not k, (yi = 1, yk = 0); or endorsing 
k but not i, (yi = 0, yk = 1). The latter two judgments make the outcome of a forced-choice task 
obvious. That is, judgment (1, 0) should lead to preference for i, and the outcome y{i, k}=1.  
Conversely, judgment (0, 1) should lead to preference for k,  y{i, k}=0.  
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 Double exponential (or Gumbel; sometimes referred to as Weibull) distribution has the cumulative 
function F(z)=exp(-exp(-z)). 
5
 Andrich did not give his decision model a name – the name ‘forced endorsement model’ is suggested 
by the author of this article. This universal decision model should not be mistaken for specific IRT models for 




However, judgments (0, 0) and (1, 1) are not admissible in a forced-choice task. 
Andrich suggested that in this case, respondents are forced to reconsider the evaluations of 
both items until one of the two admissible outcomes is reached. He further assumed that “the 
distribution of these unacceptable original outcomes (0, 0) and (1, 1) among the acceptable 
ones, (1, 0) and (0, 1), is such that the latter retain their original relative probabilities” 
(Andrich, 1989; p. 197). With this, the probability of person j preferring item i over item k is 
given by the probability of endorsing i and not endorsing k, divided by the total probability of 
either admissible outcome  
  
 
   { , }
y =1, y =0
1
y =1, y =0 y =0, y =1
ji jk
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Assuming endorsements of items i and k independent events, conditional on personal 
attributes the items measure, the probability of response (1, 0) is the product of probabilities 
of responses yji = 1 and yjk = 0. Then, the probability of preferring item i to item k can be 
written explicitly through probabilities of absolute judgments about the items 
  
   
       { , }
=1 =0 
1
=1 =0 =0 =1 
ji j jk j
j i k j
ji j jk j ji j jk j
P y P y
P y





θ θ θ θ
. (18) 
The relation to Thurstone’s and Bradley-Terry models. Andrich’s explicit 
probability expression (18) involves the probabilities of endorsement / rejection of individual 
items under comparison, and thus its specific form depends on the chosen IRT model for 
absolute judgments. The strong assumption of proportional relative probabilities of outcomes 






. Using the logistic link function to describe the probabilities of endorsements and 
non-endorsements for items i and k, and denoting 
jit  the systematic part of the random utility 
tji as before, we obtain  
    
  
     
exp 1
=1 =0 
1 exp 1 exp
ji j
ji j jk j
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t
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With this, the conditional probability of preferring item i to item k simplifies to the Bradley-
Terry logistic model (15).  
Classes of Models for Forced-Choice Questionnaires 
Having established the axes on which forced-choice models may differ, we can 
identify potential classes of models, and classify the existing models. The first axis was 
defined by the forced-choice format, where we distinguished between pairs of items and 
larger ranking blocks. For the second axis (measurement model), we considered two random 
utility models – LFA and IP models. Further classification is possible based on whether a 
unidimensional or multidimensional variety is employed. The third axis was defined by the 
decision model adopted. Here, four different decision theories yielded only two fundamental 
probabilistic models for binary choice –using the probit link (12) or the logit link (15). The 
former type can be labelled Thurstonian, and the latter Bradley-Terry. The three axes can be 
                                                 
6
 Ignoring these assumptions and using the normal ogive link function results in probabilities that are 
different from those predicted by Thurstone’s model (12). Discrepancies depend on the combination of two 




crossed to yield Thurstonian LFA, Thurstonian IP, Bradley-Terry LFA and Bradley-Terry IP 
models for either pairs of items (block size n = 2) or larger ranking blocks (block size n  3).  
Despite the fact that choices in blocks of any size may be described using binary 
outcomes of all pairwise comparisons, the block size has implications for modeling. With 
item pairs (blocks of size n = 2), the probability of an observed response pattern on the whole 
questionnaire equals the product of probabilities of all pairwise responses. This is because 
once conditioned on the underlying attributes, responses to the pairs are independent
7
. With 
blocks of size n  3, the probability of an item having a certain ranking position is the 
probability of simultaneous outcomes of n – 1 comparisons with the rest of items in the 
block
8
. However, this probability is not equal to the product of probabilities of n – 1 
preferences. This is because preference judgments involving the same item are not 
independent, even after controlling for the attributes. In random utility models (2), pairs 
involving the same item i have the shared random part of the common item utility, i. 
Consider the utility differences for two comparisons {i, k} and {i, q}, with the error terms 
 ε εi k and  ε εi q  respectively. The covariance of the two error terms is not zero:  
     2cov ε ε ,ε ε cov ε ,εi k i q i i i     . (21) 
                                                 
7
 Unlike in paired comparison tasks, it is assumed that no items are repeated across the forced-choice 
questionnaire. This is common practice in questionnaire design. 
8
 For the partial ranking design whereby only one “best” item must be chosen, the multinomial logistic 
model of McFadden (16) may be used to model choices within each block, if it can be assumed that error 
variances are all equal. The choices for different blocks are independent conditional on the personal attributes, 
and the probability of observed response pattern is the product of probabilities of block choices. Since the 




The local dependencies between pairwise judgments in blocks of size n  3 must be 
modeled. This can be done by explicitly incorporating the local dependencies in the 
covariance structure of utility differences as shown later in the article.  
Table 1 classifies the existing IRT models based on the measurement and the decision 
model they adopt. Because only Thurstonian IRT models (Brown & Maydeu-Olivares, 2011) 
allow for the local dependencies arising in blocks of size n  3, the “block size” axis is not 
included in the table. In the remainder of this section, the existing IRT models are briefly 
described; for detailed descriptions and the models’ applications to psychological assessment, 
see Brown and Maydeu-Olivares (in press). The models are presented in the chronological 
order of development. 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
TABLE 1 NEAR HERE 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Zinnes-Griggs Model 
This model was developed for questionnaires made of pairs (blocks of size n = 2) of 
ideal point items measuring one attribute. Zinnes and Griggs (1974) assumed that the utility-
attribute relationship was described by a random utility IP model with two error components 
j and ji, representing “noisy” perceptions of own ideal point j and of the item location i 
respectively,  
    ji j j i jit          . (22)  
It was therefore assumed that the items vary only in their locations and are equally 




Zinnes and Griggs (1974) showed that the conditional probability of pairwise preference is 
given by the probit function  
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 (23) 
Thus, the model belongs to the Thurstonian IP class (unidimensional).  
Andrich’s Squared Difference and Hyperbolic Cosine Models for Pairwise Preferences 
Andrich developed two models to describe choices made in pairs (n = 2) of ideal-
point items measuring one attribute. Both models assume logistically distributed errors with 
equal variances; hence, they belong to the Bradley-Terry IP class (unidimensional). 
 In his first unfolding IRT model for pairwise preferences, Andrich (1989) assumed 
the simple (unit weights) squared person-item difference as the measure of distance, using a 
modified IP model (6), with  
2
t ji j i ji       . This model can be named “Simple 
Squared Difference Model for Pairwise Preferences” or SSDMPP. The conditional 
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. (24) 
Andrich’s (1995) second model used the absolute difference as the measure of 
distance. The resulting conditional probability for pairwise preference can be simplified using 
hyperbolic cosine, hence the model name – “Simple Hyperbolic Cosine Model for Pairwise 
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. (25) 
Multi-Unidimensional Pairwise Preference (MUPP) Model 
The MUPP (Stark, Chernyshenko & Drasgow, 2005) is a model for forced-choice 
pairs of dimension pure ideal point items measuring the same or different attributes. The 
MUPP model was derived by populating Andrich’s explicit probability expression (18) with 
the binary version of the Generalized Graded Unfolding Model or GGUM (Roberts, 
Donoghue & Laughlin, 2000). The flexible GGUM enables the use of dimension pure items 
with varying discriminating power, varying locations and even varying maximal probability 
of endorsement. The resulting conditional probability of preference in the MUPP model is a 
logistic function; thus, the model belongs to the Bradley-Terry IP class (multidimensional).  
McCloy-Heggestad-Reeve Unfolding Model 
McCloy, Heggestad and Reeve (2005) adopted Coombs’s unfolding preference model 
(13) to describe the process of responding to multidimensional forced-choice blocks 
compiled from dimension pure ideal point items. Because of its deterministic nature, the 
approach has not developed a formal IRT model; however, it can be used to enable pseudo-
estimation of latent attributes. To this end, McCloy and colleagues suggested creating blocks 
of items with locations that are equal within the block and different between blocks, so that 
boundaries between person scores on different dimensions can be estimated using 
multidimensional unfolding. The person scores are then estimated as the midpoints of their 




Thurstonian IRT Model 
The Thurstonian IRT model (Brown & Maydeu-Olivares, 2011) was developed to 
enable analysis of data arising from forced-choice questionnaires using dominance items and 
blocks of any size. Items in each block may indicate the same or different attributes, or any 
mixture of the two. Moreover, dimension complex items can be modelled (Brown & 
Maydeu-Olivares, 2012). The conditional probability of pairwise preference is given by the 
probit link (12), with the LFA difference of systematic parts of the utilities (26). This model 
therefore belongs to the Thurstonian LFA class (multidimensional).  
Fundamental Properties of Forced-Choice Measurement of Individual Differences 
Probabilistic models for pairwise decisions, either using the probit link (12) or the 
logit link (15), depend on the difference of the systematic parts of item utilities, 
ji jkt t . 
These quantities are central to forced-choice measurement; they determine how effective the 
item-pairs are in measuring their underlying attributes. This section looks at fundamental 
properties of the utility differences under LFA and IP models. 
Utilities follow an LFA model 
With the LFA model (3), the difference of systematic parts of item utilities is given by 








         . (26) 
In the common case of dimension pure items (i.e. each item measures only one attribute), the 




 λ λji jk i k ia ja kb jbt t       , (27) 
and for two items measuring the same attribute it is 
  λ λji jk i k i k jt t      . (28) 
It follows from (28) that when factor loadings are equal,  i = k, the response tendency does 
not depend on the person parameter j at all; that is, unidimensional comparisons between 
items with equal factor loadings are uninformative (Maydeu-Olivares & Brown, 2010).  
The unidimensional response tendency (28) in conjunction with either logit or probit 
link function will yield a familiar s-shaped curve, examples of which are presented in Figure 
1. The two-dimensional response tendency (27) will yield the probability function describing 
a surface similar to the one presented in Figure 2.  
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
FIGURES 1 AND 2 NEAR HERE 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Utilities follow an IP model 
With the ideal point model (4), the systematic difference of utilities is given by  
     , ,j i j kji jk i kt t D D     θ δ θ δ . (29) 
The person-item distances can be measured by either the Euclidean (7) or the squared 
Euclidean (8) distance. In the general case, the distance formulae contain attribute- and item-
specific weights.  
Squared Euclidean distance IP model. It is convenient to rearrange the utility 
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 In the above, i is the fixed intercept (expression in square brackets). Then the systematic 
difference of utilities is a quadratic function of person attributes 
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unless the two items under comparison measure the same set of attributes and are equally 





). In this case, the quadratic terms 2ja disappear, and the resulting function is linear and 










      and 2ia ia iaw   .  
Brady (1989) and Tsai and Böckenholt (2001) noted this equivalence when 
considering a special case – the squared Euclidean distance IP model with unit weights. 
Essentially, from choices made between items measuring the same set of attributes, it is 
impossible to determine if the generating measurement model for the items was a LFA model 
or an IP model. In personality and similar assessments using forced-choice questionnaires, 
however, dimension complex items of that kind are never used. Attributes are usually 
measured with a set of items that form an independent clusters basis. For dimension pure 
items measuring different attributes, the difference of utilities is always a quadratic function 




  2 2 2 2 2 2
1
2
ji jk i k ia ia ja kb kb jb ia ja kb jbt t w w w w              . (32) 
However, for items measuring the same attribute, the systematic difference of 
utilities  
    2 2 22 2
1
2
ji jk i k j i k ji i k k
t t w ww w            (33) 




. Thus, for 
unidimensional ideal point items with unit weights, comparative data are indistinguishable 
from comparative data generated by an LFA model with parameters 2
1
2
i i i      and 
i i   . Furthermore, when the item locations are the same, i = k, the response tendency in 
(33) does not depend on the person parameter j at all; that is, unidimensional comparisons 
between items with equal weights and locations are not informative.  
The unidimensional response tendency (33) with equal weights is a linear function of 
j, and the conditional probability of preference is a familiar s-shaped curve (see Figure 1). 
When weights are not equal, the shape of the curve can vary from an s-shaped function to a 
Gaussian function depending on the item locations, as illustrated in Figure 3. The two-
dimensional response tendency (32) will yield the probability function describing a surface 
similar to the one presented in Figure 4. As can be seen, the ideal point response process to 
individual items involved in comparisons cause a “number of peaks and valleys” (Drasgow, 
Chernyshenko, and Stark 2009; page 74) in the response surface. 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 





Euclidean distance IP model. For dimension pure items, the systematic difference of 
utilities of items measuring different attributes is 
  2 2ja ia jb kbji jk i k ia kbt t w w           , (34) 
and the systematic difference of utilities of items measuring the same attribute is 
  2 2j i j kji jk i k i kt t w w           . (35) 





systematic difference of utilities is a piecewise linear function of j, which discriminates only 
between the location parameters of the two items. When the item locations are the same, i = 
k, the response tendency does not depend on the person parameter j – identical to IP models 
using squared Euclidean distance.  
The unidimensional IP response tendency (35) with equal weights will yield a 
piecewise s-shaped response function, examples of which are presented in Figure 5. As can 
be seen, the comparison is only discriminating between the item locations. In contrast, the 
Zinnes-Griggs version (22) of the IP measurement model yields smooth functions 
discriminating in the whole range of the attribute (see Figure 6). Two-dimensional IP 
functions akin to (34) yield a surface, similar to the one presented in Figure 4.  
-------------------------------------------------------------- 





Fitting Forced-Choice Models 
Mean and Covariance Structure of Utility Differences 
Forced-choice models may be formulated in terms of analysis of mean and covariance 
structures (Takane, 1987; Brady, 1989; Maydeu-Olivares & Böckenholt, 2005). This allows 
accounting for all dependencies between observations, either due to underlying attributes 
(and their co-variation in multidimensional models), or due to the local dependencies 
between pairwise choices in blocks of size n  3. This approach is adopted in Thurstonian 
IRT models and briefly summarized here; for more details see Brown and Maydeu-Olivares 
(2012).   
Because it is assumed that respondents are sampled randomly from the population of 
interest, all person-specific quantities (the utilities, the attributes and the errors) can be treated 
as random effects. These effects have some distributions over the population so they can be 
written in terms of random variables, omitting the person subscript j. A questionnaire with p 
forced-choice blocks elicits pñ pairwise comparisons, where ( 1) / 2n n n   is the number of 
pairwise comparisons in each block of size n. Then the latent utility differences for each 
pairwise comparison can be written in matrix form as 
 * y Αt , (36) 
where y
*
 is a (pñ) vector of latent differences y
*
{i,k} described by equation (10); t is an (pn) 
vector of item utilities ti, and A is a (pñ  pn) block-diagonal matrix of contrasts. Each block 
in A represents pairwise contrasts between items in a forced-choice block. When n = 2, each 
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   
. (37) 
Given the assumption of normally distributed utilities, the differences of utilities are 
also normally distributed, so that only means and covariances are needed to describe them. 
The aim is to express the utility differences through the item parameters and person 
attributes, depending on the measurement model adopted.  
When the utilities follow the LFA model (3), we have 
 
t  t μ Λθ ε , (38) 
where t is a (pn) vector of utility means, and  is a (pn  d) matrix of factor loadings. The 
linear factor model assumes that the common factors  have the covariance matrix ; and 
that the unique factors  are uncorrelated with the common factors and with each other so that 
their covariance matrix 2  is diagonal. Then, the mean and covariance structure of the utility 
differences is given by: 
  2* *,         ,y t y      μ Aμ γ Σ A ΛΦΛ Ψ A  (39) 
where  is a (pñ) vector of thresholds replacing the pairwise differences of the utility means 
(i.e. means of individual items are not of interest and are not estimated). 
When the utilities follow the more algebraically tractable squared Euclidean distance 







t w    t μ θ Wθ ε . (40) 
Here, tμ  is a (pn) vector of fixed parameters (expression in square parentheses in (30));  w is 
a (pn  d) matrix of the weighted item locations; W is a (pn  d) matrix of the weights; and 
(2) is a (d) vector of squared attributes  (2) 2 2 21 2, ,..., d
   θ . Because (40) involves both the 
linear and the quadratic terms of the attributes, the covariance structure of the utility 
differences will include the covariance matrix of vector , the covariance matrix of (2), and 
the covariance matrices of  with (2), and of (2) with . This rather complex structure cannot 
be reduced to the simple LFA structure (39) obtained by Takane (1987) and Brady (1989) for 
IP models with unit weights. This would amount to assuming equal weights for all items on 
all attributes – clearly an impossibility for forced-choice questionnaires involving dimension 
pure items measuring different attributes.  
Identifying the Scale Origin 
The problem of ipsative data is interpersonal incomparability of scores caused by non-
identification of the scale origin for any of the measured attributes. The scale origin for the 
attributes cannot be identified because the total test score is constrained in ipsative scoring 
(Brown & Maydeu-Olivares, 2013). To ensure proper measurement of individual differences 
in IRT models, the scale origin must be identified for all measured attributes.   
Böckenholt (2004) shows that it is impossible to identify the scale origin of item 
utilities tji or tjk from their observed difference tji  tjk for any given person j. This is because 
the addition of any constant c to each of the utilities will result in the identical difference 




is impossible to determine the absolute standing on item utilities; only the relative standings 
on the utility scale may be determined. The same is true for a block of n items – adding a 
constant c to all item utilities will yield identical pairwise utility differences. 
Fortunately, the focus of measurement in forced-choice questionnaires is not the item 
utilities but the attributes that underlie them. When a comparison {i, k} is made between 
items measuring the same attribute, the systematic difference of item utilities under the LFA 
measurement model is described by (28). Clearly, the attribute score is uniquely identified 
from this expression, unless the two factor loadings are equal, i = k. The same applies to 
unidimensional squared Euclidean ideal point models (33) with equal weights, because of 
their equivalence to LFA models for preference data. The attribute score is uniquely 
identified, unless the two item locations are equal, i = k. For the Euclidean distance IP 
model (35) with equal weights, scale identification is ensured in the interval between the two 
item locations, where the comparison is informative. To conclude, informative 
unidimensional comparisons (comparisons between items with different factor loadings or 
locations) ensure an identified scale origin of the attribute. 
When multidimensional comparisons of dimension pure items are made, the 
difference of item utilities under the LFA measurement model is described by (27). As this is 
a linear equation with two unknowns, more information is needed to identify the scale of the 
attributes. In forced-choice questionnaires, attributes are measured with multiple items, which 
provide the additional information we need. For simplicity of illustration, consider two 
pairwise comparisons, {i, k} and {q, r}, each measuring attributes a and b. From two 
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the scales of the two attributes are uniquely identified, unless the factor loadings for the pair 
{i, k} are a linear combination of the factor loadings for the pair {q, r}.  
More generally, the vector of utilities under the LFA measurement model is described 
by (38), and the vector of latent utility differences is 
 
t  At Aμ AΛθ Aε . (42) 
If the (pñ  d) matrix A, which is the product of the (pñ  pn) design matrix A and the (pn  
d) matrix of factor loadings , is of full rank, the attributes’ means and their covariance 
matrix can be identified. While the design matrix A is of reduced rank (Maydeu-Olivares, 
1999; Böckenholt, 2004), leading to non-identification of the scale origin for the item 
utilities, the product A is generally of full rank (d) unless the factor loadings have special 
properties. Consider, for example, a questionnaire consisting of three blocks of size n = 3, 

































































   
A . (43) 
An example set of nine positive factor loadings {1, 1, 1; 1, 1.2, 0.5; 1, 0.7, 2.5} will 
yield the matrix A that is of full rank (rank = 3), leading to the identified scale origin of the 




in each block, for instance {1, -1, 1; 1, 1, -1; -1, 1, 1}, will also result in identified attribute 
scales. However, equal factor loadings within every block, 
1 2 3     , 4 5 6     and 
7 8 9     , will yield a degenerate matrix A (its columns sum to 0), and non-identified 
scales for the attributes. Another example of a degenerate solution is equal factor loadings 
within every attribute, 
1 4 7     , 2 5 8     and 3 6 9     . To conclude, unless 
LFA items with special properties are used (for instance, equal factor loadings within every 
block), the scale origin of the attributes is identified in forced-choice questionnaires with 
either unidimensional or multidimensional comparisons.  
When dimension pure IP items measuring different attributes are compared, the 
difference of utilities is described by (32) (without loss of generality, the squared Euclidean 
distance can be used). For simplicity of illustration, we can also assume weights equal unity.  
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. (44) 
When the item locations for pair {i, k} are identical to the locations for pair {q, r}, ia 
= qa and kb = rb, the two equations above become identical with respect to the attributes 
(thetas), and their scales cannot be identified. Different item locations between the pairs, even 
when the locations within the pair are the same, for instance ia = kb = 1 and qa = rb = –1, 
would yield identified scales of the attributes. This simple illustration is in agreement with 
McCloy and colleagues (2005), who informally demonstrated that blocks of 
multidimensional comparisons with dimension pure ideal point items can produce uniquely 




combined in the same block, but the locations vary widely between blocks (i.e. locations of 
items within attributes vary).  
Given that the general IP measurement model includes weights, and both linear and 
quadratic terms of the attributes, the conditions for identifying the scale origin are necessarily 
more complex than the simple matrix-rank condition for LFA models. To the author’s 
knowledge, the conditions for identifying the scale origin for multidimensional IP models 
with weights have not been developed.  
Estimating Item Parameters 
Mean and covariance structures of utility differences can be estimated using general-
purpose SEM software. The observed binary outcomes of pairwise comparisons y are linked 
to the response tendencies y* through the threshold process (11), and the response tendencies 
depend on latent variables  (person attributes). Estimation of these models involves 
integration, which can be performed in two ways – either by integrating over the latent 
differences of utilities, or over the latent attributes (Takane & De Leeuw, 1987). The 
dimensionality of integration in the former is large, but because the utility differences are 
assumed multivariate normal, estimation can proceed by pieces (using tetrachoric 
correlations). This limited information approach uses a generalized least squares (GLS) 
estimation. When integrating over the latent attributes, dimensionality of integration is 
smaller and the maximum likelihood estimation based on the full joint probabilities of 
response patterns can be used. However, one must be concerned about whether local 
independence conditional on the latent attributes is satisfied. As discussed previously, the 
local independence assumption holds when items are presented in pairs. However, when 
block size is n > 2, the local independence assumption does not hold. Even when block size is 




choice questionnaires usually measure several attributes, thus necessitating multidimensional 
integration. Thus, limited information methods based on tetrachorics are the estimation 
method of choice for general mean and covariance structures arising from forced-choice 
questionnaires. 
Theory for estimating LFA mean and covariance structures (39), aka Thurstonian IRT 
models, has been fully developed, including all necessary identification constraints (see 
Brown & Maydeu-Olivares, 2012). These models may be estimated with respect to item 
parameters and structural parameters (i.e. correlations between the latent attributes) using 
Mplus (L.K. Muthén & B.O. Muthén, 1998-2012), which conveniently combines all 
necessary features. Applications to date demonstrate successful re-analysis of existing forced-
choice data using this approach (Brown & Maydeu-Olivares, 2013; Brown, 2009; Brown & 
Bartram, 2009-2011).  
As for the IP models, theory for parameter specification and identification constraints 
has been developed for special (unidimensional) cases only. Specifically, item parameters 
(locations) in the Zinnes-Griggs model can be estimated by marginal maximum likelihood 
(MML) procedure (Zinnes & Griggs, 1974; Stark & Drasgow, 2002). In Andrich’s (1989, 
1995) models for unfolding pairwise preferences, the item locations can also be estimated by 
maximum likelihood. So far, no multidimensional IP models (i.e. MUPP model or McCloy-
Heggestad-Reeve approach) have estimated the item parameters from actual forced-choice 
data, which is not surprising giving their complexity and non-monotone nature of response 
functions (see Figure 4). Currently these models may be used for person parameter estimation 
only, with the item parameters assumed known (in practice, they are established through 




Estimating Person Parameters 
For personality and similar assessments, differentiating between people on a set of 
attributes is the main objective of measurement. After the model parameters – the item 
parameters and the correlations between the latent attributes – have been estimated, the factor 
scores may be estimated. To this end, maximum likelihood estimation can be used. 
Alternatively, Bayesian estimation with the multivariate normal prior with the covariance 
matrix  can be used, either maximizing the mean of the posterior distribution (expected a-
posteriori or EAP), or its mode (maximum a-posteriori or MAP).  The former can be used in 
applications with one or two measured attributes; the latter is recommended in applications 
with many measured attributes.  
In questionnaires using blocks of size n = 2, responses are independent conditional on 
the attributes, thus making estimation straightforward. In questionnaires with blocks of size n 
 3, however, structured local dependencies between pairwise comparisons involving the 
same item exist. So far, Bayesian estimation ignoring these local dependencies has been used 
in applications with good results (Brown & Maydeu-Olivares, 2011; 2012; 2013).  
Conclusions and Discussion 
This article provided a common framework for describing models for forced-choice 
questionnaire data, using three axes: 1) the forced-choice format (i.e. block size); 2) the 
measurement model describing the item utilities through a set of psychological attributes the 
questionnaire measures; and 3) the decision model explaining choices between individual 
items. The measurement model dictates the specific expression for the systematic differences 
of item utilities. The distributional assumptions about the utility random parts dictate the 




the probabilities of pairwise preferences. By combining the three axes in different ways, 
models suitable for a wide range of forced-choice questionnaire data can be described. 
Popular models for choice behavior have been used to describe decisions in forced-
choice questionnaires. This article shows that the four decision models considered here 
yielded two types of IRT models for pairwise choices, with the conditional probabilities 
being either logit or probit functions of the systematic utility differences (in this article, they 
were denoted Thurstonian and Bradley-Terry types). While Coombs’s unfolding model 
implicitly assumes an ideal point measurement model, and is a special case of Thurstone’s 
law, the other decision models are open to the use of different measurement models. Thus, 
Thurstone’ law of comparative judgment can be used in conjunction with either LFA or IP 
items, or indeed with items described by other measurement models. The same is true for the 
explicit probability expressions provided by Bradley and Terry, and Andrich – they can be 
used in conjunction with different measurement models for absolute judgments.  
Choices between available options with respect to any of the three axes can be 
motivated by the necessity to find a model suitable for an existing forced-choice 
questionnaire, or by the opportunity to create a questionnaire from scratch. When modelling 
data collected using an existing questionnaire, the choice of options is narrowed by the nature 
of items (for example, assuming a dominance response process or an unfolding process), 
distributional assumptions, block size and the number of attributes measured. When creating 
a new questionnaire, the available options are vast, and the question arising is whether any of 
the options are superior to the rest.  
The question of the optimal block size is one of finding a balance between the 
information captured by item comparisons, and questionnaire usability. Combining items in 
larger blocks increases the amount of information per item. While choice between n = 2 items 




and choice among n = 4 items yields ñ = 6 pieces of information. Although the item 
information is not additive due to the local dependencies between pairwise comparisons 
within the same block, gains are obvious. However, human capacity to process comparisons 
is limited. There is evidence that the use of large blocks increases cognitive complexity of 
choice tasks, and worsens the quality of data obtained, which may have adverse impact on 
less educated or people with lesser reading skills (Brown & Bartram, 2009-2011).  
The question of the “best” measurement model to use in choice tasks was considered 
in this article by looking at the response tendencies determining choices – the utility 
differences under LFA and IP models. Although reflecting different response processes in 
absolute judgments, the two measurement models can yield identical or similar properties 
when it comes to comparative judgments. A number of important points concerning these 
properties are summarized in the article. First, IP models in which equally discriminating 
items measuring the same attribute are compared in the same block produce identical utility 
difference functions to LFA models. Therefore, if the objective is to measure psychological 
attributes using unidimensional comparisons, it does not matter which type of items are used 
– those assuming an LFA model, or those assuming an IP model. It is impossible to tell from 
comparative data which generating measurement model was assumed for the questionnaire 
items. Either measurement model will produce informative comparisons if basic rules of 
forced-choice block construction are met. These rules are remarkably similar for LFA and IP 
models. For LFA models, items must have very different factor loadings to yield well-
discriminating unidimensional comparisons (Maydeu-Olivares & Brown, 2010); for IP 
models, items must have very different locations (Drasgow, Chernyshenko & Stark, 2009).  
Second, the rules for identifying the attributes’ scale origins and thus ensuring 
interpersonal comparability are remarkably similar for LFA and IP models. For 




different locations in IP models, ensure an identified scale origin of the attribute. For 
multidimensional LFA models, the matrix of factor loadings  must yield a full-rank matrix 
of contrast loadings A. This, for instance, if not fulfilled when factor loadings within every 
block are equal, or when factor loadings within every attribute are equal. For 
multidimensional IP models, the locations of items within blocks may be equal; however, the 
locations of items within attributes must be different (McCloy, Heggestad & Reeve, 2005). 
As long as the attribute scales are identified, either LFA or IP models can be used for 
measuring psychological attributes using unidimensional or multidimensional comparisons. 
It appears that these fundamental properties of forced-choice questionnaire data are 
not widely understood. The problems with identifying the scale origin of utilities from 
comparative judgments described by Böckenholt (2004) have translated into skepticism about 
the ability of forced-choice questionnaires to “recover” the absolute standings on attributes. 
In this article, it is shown that when the focus of measurement is the attributes underlying the 
items, the scale origin may be identified without any special remedies such as embedding a 
small number of unidimensional pairs into multidimensional forced-choice questionnaires 
advocated in Stark, Chernyshenko and Drasgow (2005; also Drasgow, Chernyshenko & 
Stark; 2009). 
The conclusions about the fundamental similarity of measurement inferred from LFA 
and IP models are somewhat ironic, considering that there has been much debate about 
advantages of either measurement model in general, and their merits in forced-choice 
applications in particular (see Drasgow, Chernyshenko & Stark, 2010; and Brown & 
Maydeu-Olivares, 2010). In reality, the questionnaire developer has a choice – to either 
utilize simple-to-analyze and widely available LFA items, or more rare IP items, or indeed 




measurement; the choice of a measurement model should be based on other considerations. 
These include conceptual suitability of the item type to the type of assessment (e.g. 
comparing attitude statements might call for ideal point items, while comparing performance 
statements might call for dominance items); pragmatic considerations regarding item-writing 
practices (Huang & Mead, 2014; Brown & Maydeu-Olivares, 2010); and pragmatic modeling 
considerations (methods and software available, whether the item parameters can be 
estimated from forced-choice data etc.). Given the widespread confusion about the types of 
items that can be used in forced-choice questionnaires (see commentaries in response to 
Drasgow, Chernyshenko & Stark, 2010) it is hoped that this conclusion will inform well-
motivated choices in applications.  
Even a limited selection of decision models and measurement models included here 
yielded a wide range of forced-choice models possible in principle. Although the focus of this 
article was on simple choice formats requiring IRT models for binary data, psychometric 
modelling of comparative judgments does not have to stop here. A general SEM framework 
for estimating mean and covariance structure of utility differences described in this article 
allows extensions to ordered categorical or continuous data. Such extensions would enrich 
the current repertoire, and allow modeling graded comparisons data, pick any constant-sum 
data (aka compositional data; Chan, 2003; Böckenholt, 2006) – the range of potential future 
applications is vast. I look forward to new developments in this area.  
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Table 1. Classification of existing IRT models for forced-choice questionnaires 
  Decision model 
Measurement model Thurstonian Bradley-Terry 
LFA 1. Unidimensional Thurstonian IRT  
2. Multidimensional Thurstonian IRT   





4. Multidimensional  MUPP 
Note. LFA = Linear Factor Analysis; IP = Ideal Point. SSDMPP = Simple Squared 
Difference Model for Pairwise Preferences; SHCMPP = Simple Hyperbolic Cosine Model for 







Figure 1.  Response function for preference between two items measuring the same 
attribute under a LFA measurement model, and under a squared Euclidean distance IP model 








Figure 2.  Response function for preference between two items measuring different 






Figure 3.  Response functions for preferences between two items measuring the same 
attribute under a squared Euclidean distance IP model with unequal weights.  
Note. The first item has weight wi
2
 = 1.5, and the second has weight wk
2







Figure 4.  Response surface for preference between two items measuring different 







Figure 5.  Response functions for preferences between two items measuring the same 






Figure 6.  Response functions for preferences between two items measuring the same 
attribute under the Zinnes-Griggs version (22) of an IP measurement model.  
 
